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NOTES
NEGLIGENCE-"EMERGENCY'"-THE

EFFECT OF AN "EMERGENCY"

IN THE REQUIREMENT OF ORDINARY CARE

IN THE LAW OF NEGLI-

GENCE.-Does the existence of an emergency change the standard by

which a person's conduct must be measured in determining whether
or not he is guilty of negligence or contributory negligence? It is prop-

er in considering this problem first to define an "emergency" and to
discuss the various ways by which these predicaments arise, and then
to consider and determine what the conduct of persons acting in these
situations should be.
An "emergency" is defined as "a sudden or unexpected happening;
an unforeseen occurence or condition; specifically a perplexing contingency or complication of circumstances." I Also as Dean, J., said,
in Colfax County v. Butler County,2 "an 'emergency' is an event or
occasional combination of circumstances calling for immediate action,
pressing necessity, a sudden or unexpected happening." The emergency
rule, in connection with negligence, is invoked by both plaintiffs and
defendants. It is most frequently invoked in behalf of a plaintiff who
relies on the sudden emergency to relieve him of the imputation of
1 3 Cent. Dict. 1897.
2 83 Neb. 803, 120 N. W. 444 (1909).
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contributory negligence; 3 but it is also pleaded hy a defendant who
4
seeks to be relieved of the negligence with which he is charged.
An emergency may be created in three ways, by a plaintiff, as in
Brown v. Soutkwestern Bell Telephone Co.,5 or by a defendant, as in
Queen v. Manheim,6 or by a third person, as in Stewart v. Central
Vermont Ry. Co. 7 The general rule in all these situations is the same,
-the person creating the emergency cannot avail himself of the existence of the sudden emergency, either to relieve himself of the imputa3 "Where by the negligence of another, one is compelled to choose instantly
between two hazards, he will not be guilty of contributory negligence, although
the one he selects results in injury and he might have escaped had he chosen
the other or had he done nothing. However, in order to be free from negligence,
one must exercise such care in the emergency as would be exercised under the
same or similar circumstances by an ordinary prudent person." "Negligence," 45
C. J. 965. For a typical case, see Betzold v. Rossi Floral Co. et al., 23 Pac. (2d.)
839 (Cal. 1933).
4 "Negligence," 45 C. J. 712, note 70. In Filippone v. Reisenburger, 119 N.
Y. S. 632 (1909), the plaintiff and defendant were standing on a runway leading
into an excavation when the defendant stepped on a barrel which caused him
to lose his balance. In order to save himself from falling into the excavation he
grabbed the plaintiff's legs causing the plaintiff to fall and injure himself. Held,
that in either event, the injury was accidental and under the rule that an act
done under pressing danger is presumed to have been done involuntarily, the defendant was not liable.
5 274 S. W. 816 (Mo. 1925). In this case the defendant company dug a hole
on the alley line just south of the plaintiff's barn. The plaintiff while trying
to head off his calf from running by the barn, fell in the hole 4nd was injured.
Held, the plaintiff by his own conduct, i. e., -attempting to stop the calf, plus
the previous knowledge of the existence of the hole, had created the emergency
and could not avail himself of the "emergency rule." See also: Labatt v. Bell
Cabs Inc., 145 So. 296 (La. 1933); Hall v. St. Louis Ry. Co., 240 S. W. 175
(Mo. 1922); Independent Oil Refining Co. v. Lueders, 17 La. App. 154, 134 So.
418 (1931).
6 120 So. 486 (La. 1928). In this case one of the defendants was driving at
an excessive rate of speed, and through this negligence he threatened to collide
with the other defendant who acting to avoid the collision drove his car on neutral
ground and injured the plaintiff who was waiting for a street car. Held, the defendant who through his negligent conduct created the emergency which caused
the other defendant to so act as to injure the plaintiff is solely liable. The actor in
the emergency is not liable. See also: Yates v. Morotti et al., 8 Pac. (2d.) 519
(Cal. 1932); Isaacson v. Boston, Worchester and New York St. Ry., 180 N. E.
118 (Mass. 1932); Godsey v. Cox et al., 10 Pac. (2d.) 871 (Kan. 1932).
7 86 Vt. 398, 85 Atl. 745 (1913). In this case the defendant tompany's train
was just moving away from the station when the conductor saw a man dash
for the train, stumble, and fall to the edge of the platform some ten inches from
the wheel. The conductor jumped aboard and pulled the emergency brake causing the train to stop suddenly and injuring the plaintiff, a passenger who as yet
had not reached her seat. Held, the conductor acted in 'the emergency which had
been created by a third person, as a man of ordinary prudence, thus the defendant company was not liable. See also: Allen v. Schultz et al., 107 Wash. 393,
181 Pac. 916 (1919); Donahue v. Kelly, 181 Pa. 93, 37 AUt. 186 (1897).
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tion of contributory fault or to excuse his negligence. 8 In this regard

an interesting situation arises. In the case of Curtis v. Hubbel 9 the
emergency was in fact created by a pedestrian walking along the highway, causing the defendant who pleaded the sudden emergency as a
defense to the charge of negligence, to veer across the center of the
road in to the on-coming plaintiff. The Ohio court held, that since
the defendant was driving in violation of a statute, 10 he himself created
the emergency, was guilty of negligence per se, and could not excuse
the results of his conduct by pleading the emergency. "In a sense the
act was done in an emergency, but it is an emergency caused by the
violation of a positive law of which he who violates the law cannot
claim the benefit."
At the first superficial glance it may appear that since an emergency, as the very word connotes, arises suddenly and calls for hasty,
unpremeditated, and often instinctive conduct, the general standard of
the law of negligence, that of ordinary care, is inapplicable." This, however, is an erroneous impression because the standard of care never
varies, but is always the conduct of a "reasonable man" under like
circumstances. One might misunderstand the language of the court in
Rosen v. Lloveras: 12 "One suddenly confronted with an emergency is
not held to exercise the presence of mind and judgment required of
one apprehending the danger with sufficient time to realize and avert
8 "Sudden emergency rule will not apply if the emergency arises through
the prior negligence of the person invoking its protection, which limitation applies to the one causing the injury and the injured party." Casey v. Siciliano, 165
At. 1 (Pa. 1933).
9 182 N. E. 589 (Ohio App. 1932).
10 "No person shall operate a motor vehicle in and upon the public roads
and highways at a speed greater or less than is reasonable or proper, having due
regard to the traffic, surface, and width of the road or highway and of any other
conditions then existing, and no person shall drive any motor vehicle in and
upon any public road or highway at a greater speed than will permit him to
bring it to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead." Sec. 12603 Ohio Gen.
Code (amended 1929) (113 Ohio Laws 283).
For similar statute, see Comp. Laws of Mich. (1929) § 4697. Interpreting this
statute: Bowmaster v. William H. De Pree Co., 252 Mich. 505, 233 N. W. 395.
(1930).
11 See charge to the jury in Curtis v. Hubbell, op. cit. supra note 9, at p. 591.
"It seems best to say that the standard of care is to be measured by the conduct of the ordinary man under similar circumstances." Chapin on Torts, p. 523.
See also the expression of the rule by Prentice, J.,: ". . . [Negligence may be said
to consist] in the failure to exercise that degree of care under given circumstances which a person of ordinary prudence would exercise under similar circumstances." Stedman v. O'Neil, 82 Conn. 199, 72 Atl. 923, 22 L. R. A. (NS)
1229. (Conn. 1909).
12 148 So. 734 (La. 1933). Similar statement is contained in Central Georgia
Ry. Co. v. Barnes, 167 S. E. 217 (Ga. 1933).
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it." So, too, the opinion given by Sharpe, J., in Zehaver v. Koepke:' 5
"The law makes allowances for acts done in emergency and sudden
peril." These two decisions, however, do not refute the doctrine of
ordinary care, but merely fail to state in unequivocal terms, as it
should always be stated, that the emergency is always to be considered as one of the circumstances in determining what the conduct
should have been.
In any case where a person is suddenly confronted with an emergency and is forced to act hurriedly and without forethought, it cannot be said that his conduct is imprudent, merely because by hindsight
it is learned it is mistanken. In Austin v. EasternMassachusetts Street
Railway Co. 14 Field, J., said: "Though in retrospect it may appear
that the plaintiff's choice of a course of action was mistaken, we cannot say as a matter of law that at the time he made the choice in
view of the need of speedy decision and action, it was not a prudent
one under the circumstances of the case." Holmes, C. J., expresses the
same thought very tersely in Kane v. Worchester Consolidated Street
Railway: 15 "A choice may be mistaken and yet prudent." Nor is it
important that the course-chosen be the most judicious one. In Betzold
v. Rossi Floral Co. et al.1 the court said: "One suddenly confronted
with unexpected danger without fault on his part, is required to use
only such means for avoiding the danger as would be used by a person
of ordinary prudence, and need not choose the most judicious course
of action."
It is readily understood that one will act differently in such situations where there are extenuating circumstances than he will in situations where there are no extenuating circumstances, but the mere fact
that a person finds himself placed in such a predicament or emergency
does not relieve him of the obligation of using ordinary care. "Being
so placed does not relieve the actor of his duty to use ordinary care,
but the emergency is merely one of the circumstances to consider to
245 N. W. 490 (Mich. 1932).
169 N. E. 484 (Mass. 1929).
15 182 Mass. 201, 65 N. E. 54 (1902). See also: Lemay v. Springfield Street
Ry., 210 Mass. 63, 96 N. E. 79 (1911); Fitch v. Bay State Street Railway, 237
Mass. 65, 129 N. E. 423 (1921).
13
14

16 Op. cit. supra note 3.
"A person suddenly confronted with an unexpected danger, without any
fault on his part is only required to use such means for avoiding the danger
as would be used by a person of ordinary prudence, and he is not held to that
strict accountability which would require that the course chosen be the most
judicious one." Carnahan v. Motor Transit Co., 65 Cal. App. 402, 224 Pac. 143
(1924).
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determine if ordinary care has been exercised."' 17 Thus it can be
stated unequivocally that an emergency does not change the requirement of ordinary care. It is as said in the headnote to Curtis v.
Hubbel:I s "While acts or omissions of ordinarily careful and prudent
persons would probably not be the same in a case where no emergency existed, the required degree of care is always 'ordinary care,'
namely, that degree of care which ordinarily careful and prudent persons are accustomed to exercise under the same or similar circumstances."
The amount of care might change, but the degree or standard is
always the same,-ordinary care,-the care that would be used by an
ordinary prudent man under the same circumstances, the emergency
itself always being considered and weighed as one of the circumstances.
,There are other factors that have been considered by the common
law as affecting the standard of due care. Where an actor takes charge
of another whom the actor's non-tortious conduct has rendered helpless,
the actor is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to give the other
aid or protection; but the gratuitous nature of the services is an important factor in determining whether the actor has exercised reasonable care.' 9 Public utility may justify an otherwise impermissible
risk, as where the legal rate of speed is exceeded in pursuit of a felon
or in conveying a desperately wounded patient to a hospital; yet this
does not mean that due care need not be exercised under the circumstances of the particular case. 20 Again, the common law makes allowance in case of one learning to drive an automobile. An error which
would be inexcusable in a practiced driver may not be negligence on the
part of a beginner. 21
Maurice W. Lee.

NUISANCE - OVERHANGING BRANCHES - OWNERSHIP OF LINE
TREES.-The recent case of Luke v. Scott 1 has re-awakened the old
question of overhanging branches. In this case the plaintiff sued the
defendant, a neighbor, for the latter's wrongful and malicious cutting
of two "Trees of Paradise" on her land. The defendant pled that the
17

"Negligence," 45 C. J. 711, note 62.

"The existence of an emergency is merely one of the factors in the light of
which the conduct of the actor must be judged. The standard of conduct does
not vary in such cases. It must be reasonable." Jones v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 139
AtI. 214 (N. H. 1927).
18 Op. cit. supra note 9.
Restatement
Restatement
21 Restatement
1 187 N. E. 63
19
20

of the Law of Torts § 197.
of the Law of Torts § 172.
of the Law of Torts § 180.
(Ind. 1933).
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trees grew near to the boundary, and that some of the branches hung
over his property and interfered with a line fence he was building and
that therefore they were a nuisance which he had a right to abate.
Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.
But the decision of the lower court was upheld, the court finding that
both the trees were on the plaintiff's land, and that "under such circumstances an adjoining owner has no right to cut or destroy the
trunk of a tree which is entirely on the land of another, although it
causes him personal inconvenience, discomfort or injury; and, if he
cuts or destroys such tree he is liable in damages to the owner thereof.',
This problem is a long-standing one. Properly speaking, there are
three problems arising from the one situation: First, whether overhanging branches are a nuisance, and if so, what are the rights of
the injured party?; Second, who owns whatever fruit the branches
might bear?; Third, in the case of a "line tree," in whom should the
2
ownership reside? The first case upon the subject, Morris v. Baker,
arose in 1616, holding that "If the branches of your tree grow over
on my land, I can cut them off, but I cannot justify cutting them off
before they grow over my land because of the fear of their so doing."
The later case of Lemmon v. Webb 3 first raised the question of
whether or not overhanging branches were a nuisance, stating that
"The result of the authorities seems to be this:"The encroachment of the boughs and roots over and within the
land of the adjoining owner is not a trespass or occupation of that
land which by lapse of time could become a right. It is a nuisance.
"For any damage occasioned by this an action on the case would
lie.
"Also, the person whose land is so affected may abate the nuisance
if the owner of the tree neglects to do so. Whether he may do so
without notice is not stated distinctly in any case; but on the whole
...this is the meaning.. . .the true reading of Pickering v. Rudd
[4 Camp. 219, 1 Stark. 56 (1815)] is, that he may do so without
notice if he can do so without trespassing upon the land in which the
tree grows. .

.

. it would be better if the law were, that before cut-

ting a neighbor's trees notice should be given in order to afford to
the owner of the trees an opportunity of removing the boughs which
occasion a nuisance. Whether that is the law or not, no one but an
ill-disposed person would do such an act without previous notice.
There was no emergency in this case." An "emergency" would exist,
under this doctrine, when the security of life or property is endangered
by the nuisance.
2

3

3 Bulstr. 196 (1616).
(18941 3 Ch. App. 1
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The English common law seems to be that where a nuisance is
occasioned by an act of commission the person injured may abate the
nuisance without previously giving notice to him who actually committed the nuisance while he is in possession of the premises upon
which the nuisance exists. There would probably be liability for any
substantial damage in fact occasioned by such abatement. But where
the nuisance is occasioned by omission, or created by a previous occupier of the premises upon which the nuisance exists, it is necessary
to give notice to the present occupier of the premises as a condition
precedent to the privilege to abate except in case of an emergency.
There would probably be liability for substantial damage in fact occasioned by the abatement.
The question of notice was also raised in Jones v. Williams,4 but
the court held that overhanging branches were such an "unequivocal
nuisance" as to need no notice. The ruling of Lemmon v. Webb is
the law in England today, 5 with the exception that a tenant cannot
recover when the overhanging branches of his landlord's trees have
injured him.6
7
The American cases have followed Lemmon v. Webb from the first.
Not only branches but protruding roots may be cut off.8 It was held
in Illinois that a city has not the right to cut the trunk of an overhanging tree without compensation. 9 Grandona v. Lovdal 10 seems to be
the leading American case in point. Here a long line of cotton wood
trees were growing so close to the land of the plaintiff that they interfered with his plowing and growing of fruit trees. The court held
that "the trees and overhanging 'branches, insofar as they were on or
over his land belonged to the plaintiff and he could cut them off or
trim them at his pleasure." There seems to be a split of authority as
to whether an action for damages will lie against the owner of the
tree without actual damage being caused by the overhanging branches.
Countryman v. Lighthill 11 held that such an action is maintainable,
and Ackerman v. Ellis 12 ruled to the contrary, although it did not
deny the right of the injured party to abate the nuisance without
notice.
11 M. & W. 176 (1843).

4

5 Smith v. Giddy [1904] 3 K. B. 488.
Cheater v. Cater

G
7

296,
S

[1918]

1 K. B. 247.

Lyman v. Hale, 11 Conn. 177 (1836); Buckingham v. Elliot, 62 Miss.
52 Am. Rep. 188 (1884).
Robinson v. Clapp, 65 Conn. 365, 32 Ati. 939 (1895).

9 Simpson v. City of Gibson, 164 Il. App. 147
10 78 Cal. 611, 21 Pac. 366 (1889).
11
12

24 Hun 405 (1881).
81 N. J. Law 1, 79 At. 883 (1911).

(1911).
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However, both English 13 and American 14 cases are in accord on
the view that the injured party may not enter upon the defendant's
land and cut down the tree itself, and that for such an action trespass
will lie. In Tanner v. Wallbrum 15 it was ruled that although the
plaintiff could lop off branches overhanging his land he could not go
to equity for a mandatory injunction to remove the tree, as the occasion was not one of pressing necessity. In the same line is the holding 1" that an injunction will lie to restrain an adjoining land owner
of a rural lot from cutting trees on the plaintiff's land. There is a
Vermont case, 17 however, which granted an injunction to restrain
a railroad from planting willow trees near the boundary line as a
fence, since the roots of the trees and the shade cast by them would
injure a neighbor's land, and no necessity could be shown for that
kind of fence.
There seems to be no controversy on the question of ownership of
the fruit growing on overhanging branches. In 1616, Millen v. Fawdry 's ruled that "if trees grow in the hedge and the fruit falls into
another's ground, the owner may go in and take it." This is still the
English view. Apparently the first case in America was Lyman v.
Hale 19 where it was held that "a pear tree, standing wholly on plaintiff's land is, with its fruits, the sole property of the plaintiff, even
though the branches overhang another's property." Skinner v. Wilder 20 went further and ruled that if one takes fruit from branches
overhanging his land, he is liable to an action for either trespass or
trover. A much-quoted case is that of Hoffman v. Armstrong.21 Here
the plaintiff owned a fruit-bearing tree, the branches of which overhung the defendant's land. The plaintiff's sister was standing upon
a line fence in order to pluck fruit from the overhanging branches,
and the defendant pushed her off. He was adjudged liable for trespass,
the court holding that since the fruit was perishable the plaintiff was
privileged to trespass on the defendant's property to save his own. The
defendant would have no right to nominal damages for the plaintiff's
trespass. An interesting contrast may be made between the holding of
this case and those of Ploof v. Putnam 22 and Vincent v. Lake Erie
13 Morris v. Baker, 1 Rolle 393 (1616); Masters v. Pollie, 2 Rolle 141 (1620).
14

Op. cit. supra note 7; Toledo, St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., et al., v. Loop,

139 Ind. 542, 39 N. E. 306 (1894).

15 77 Mo. App. 262 (1898).
16 Comfort v. Everhart, 35 Wkly. Notes, Case 364 (1894).
17 Brock v. Conn. & P. R. R. Co., 35 Vt. 373 (1862).
18 1 Latch 119, 82 Eng. Rep. 304 (1616).
19 Op. cit. supra note 7.
20 38 Vt. 115 (1865).
21 48 N. Y. 201 (1872).
22 81 Vt. 471, 71 AUt. 188, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1072, 15 Am. Cas. 1151 (1908).
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Trans. Co.23 The substance of the last two rulings is that, while one
has the privilege to trespass upon another's land to save his life or
property he is liable for any damage in fact produced thereby, but
2 4
would not be liable for nominal damages. And in Beardslee v. French
it was pointed out that a defendant who removed a nuisance placed in
a highway by the plaintiff was liable to the latter for any unnecessary
damage that he caused in abating the nuisance.
The third phase of the problem has the longest history. The Roman
Law was given by Justinian in his Institutes 25 on the point of line
trees: "So that if a tree of a neighbor borders so closely upon the
ground of Titius as to take root in it and be wholly nourished there,
we may affirm that such tree is become the property of Titius; for
reason doth not permit that a tree should be deemed the property of
any other than of him in whose ground it hath rooted; therefore if
a tree planted near the bounds of one person shall also extend its
roots in the land of another it will become common to both." Thus it
will be seen that ownership was determined in the Roman courts by the
position of the roots. The first English case of Masters v. Pollie2 6 decided the question on the position of "the main part of the tree" and
also upon the basis of where the tree was planted. This became known
as the "tree follows the trunk" theory. It was followed in 1622 by
an anonymous case 27 in 2 Rolle 255, which held: "If a tree grows in
a hedge that divides the land of A and B and the roots take nourishment in the land of A and also that of B they are tenants in common
of that tree." This was apparently the first appearance of the "tenants in common" theory in English courts in regard to line trees.
However, this case was given little attention in the courts of the
time, for Masters v. Pollie was the ruling until 1698, when Waterman
v. Soper 28 opposed it with the "branches follow the roots" theory.
In this case the court held: "If A plants a tree upon the extremest
limits of his land, and the tree growing extends its roots into the
land of B next adjoining, A and B are tenants in common of this
tree. If all the roots grow into the land of A though the boughs overshadow the land of B, yet the branches follow the roots and the
property of the whole is in A." There followed a long series of contentions over these two views.
23

24

109 Minn. 456, 124 N. W. 221, 27 L. R. A. (NS) 312 (1910).
7 Conn. 125 (1828).

25 Cooper's Justinian, 79.
26 Op. cit. supra note 13.
27 "Si un arber cresce in un hedge que devide le terre de A & B et per les
rootes prist nourishment in le terre de A & aussi de B, ilssont tennants in common de cest arbre."
28 1 Ld. Raym. 737 (1698).
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The controversy appears to have been settled in England in Holder
v. Coates,20 wherein Judge Littledale said: "I remember another case
upon this point, called Waterman v. Soper . ..I am of the opinion
that the doctrine in the case of Masters v. Pollie was preferable to
that in Waterman v. Soper." However, the latter view is still offered
in many litigations, although it is invariably overruled. In France the
civil code provides that boundary hedges and trees within them are
common property. 30
32
The two cases of Lyman v. Hale 31 and Skinner v. Wilder, already referred to, held with the doctrine of Masters v. Pollie. In
both cases the defendants continued the controversy begun in England by basing their cases on Waterman v. Soper. But in each case
the court settled the issue by defining the term "extremest limits"
used in Waterman v. Soper to allocate the position of the disputed
tree as meaning on the boundary line, and by holding that Waterman
%. Soper had not been decided on the position of the roots alone.
Relyea v. Barber 33 held that a line-tree is owned in common, and
pushed the doctrine further with the aid of the maxim "Sic utere tuo
ut non alienum laedes," ruling that treble damages may be awarded
to one co-owner where the other has cut the line-tree. A tenant in
common has the right to cut his own half of the tree but, with true
judicial humor, it was held that he could only do so in a manner that
would not injure the other tenant's half. Dubois v. Beaver 3 4 ruled
that trees standing on the line are owned in common, and that one
co-owner may bring trespass if the other cuts the tree. This view is
agreed with in Musch v. Burkhart,3 5 and an interesting comparison
is made with the English case of Martin v. Knowlly,36 which held
that one tenant in common could not maintain an action of waste
against the other because the latter cut down trees of a proper age.
The distinction was that in the English case the injured party was a
tenant who had leased to another, the latter cutting down the tree.
It was held that the plaintiff had suffered no loss, the tree being of
proper age; he was awarded half of the price that the tree brought.
The American holdings are now unanimous .inadopting the "tree
follows trunk" theory; and it would seem from the Scott case, quoted
in the beginning, that the overhanging branch question were at long
last settled for all time. In summary, the rulings are: First, that the
injured party has always the privilege, without giving notice, to cut
29

M.

30

Cf. Skinner v. Wilder, op. cit. supra note 20.

31
32

33
34
35

36

& M. 112 (1827).

Op. cit. supra note 7.
Op. cit. supra note 20.

34 Barb. (N. Y.) 547 (1861).
25 N. Y. 123 (1862).
83 Iowa 301, 32 Am. St. Rep. 305 (1891).
8 T. R. 145 (1799).

